Smart Growth: 
Opportunity or Threat to Affordable Housing?

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1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to address the issue of how well smart growth in the U.S. assures a sufficient supply of affordable housing, both to meet expanding population demands as well as to help meet existing affordable housing need. It begins by raising the issue of the relationship between smart growth and affordable housing and whether smart growth is a threat or an opportunity for affordable housing. It briefly describes the empirical research that explores the connection between, on the one hand, smart growth and its sibling concept growth management, and affordable housing on the other, and concludes, as have others, that various approaches to controlling population growth can increase housing prices and decrease housing affordability, thereby suggesting that smart growth is a potential threat to affordable housing. At the same time, the paper recognizes and assesses a number of key affordable housing strategies that can be effectively incorporated into a smart growth agenda. These include 1) strategies that can be used to integrate affordable housing in newly developing areas built with smart growth principles, 2) strategies that promote the development of affordable housing in central city neighborhoods undergoing redevelopment that is also consistent with smart growth, and 3) strategies that build on the special characteristics of smart growth (accessibility to employment, stores, schools, and recreation; employment of alternative transportation modes; and energy conservation) that also increase housing affordability.

The key question then becomes, how likely is it that local and state governments practicing smart growth will adopt these strategies? A preliminary answer to this question is given by examining the case of Florida, which has adopted both significant growth management and affordable housing legislation, and asking whether this legislation has resulted in significant integration of affordable housing with smart growth strategies. Although Florida has not officially adopted smart growth as a guiding principle, its growth management legislation exhibits smart growth features and provides an excellent case to test
whether growth regulation threatens or facilitates affordable housing. In addition to assessing the general framework provided by the Florida growth management and affordable housing system, the paper will also use a study of a single city in Florida that has attempted to incorporate both smart growth and affordable housing principles in its comprehensive plan to answer the overarching question of whether communities practicing smart growth will adopt complementary affordable housing strategies. The paper will conclude with suggestions for further research.

2. **Defining Smart Growth and Affordable Housing**

Smart growth attempts to shape the form of urban development from one which features sprawling, low density communities consisting of uniform land uses, in which individuals ride alone in their personal autos to and from work as well as other destinations. Such development patterns are seen as damaging to the environment by encouraging air and water pollution while making inefficient and wasteful use of land that could otherwise be preserved in a more natural state as well as wasteful of the nation’s and the world’s energy resources. It is a form of development that in the US, at least, was perfected in the immediate years after World War II as developers such as Edward Levitt, who developed the Levittowns that served metropolitan New York City and Philadelphia, recognized that American middle and working class families, enjoying the prosperity of that era, longed to own a home with a front and back yard and space between their neighbor’s home and theirs.

In many ways smart growth is defined as the antithesis of sprawl as it addresses environmental protection and energy conservation by seeking to

- **a.** increase density of development
- **b.** increase compactness of urban places by limiting urban growth boundaries
- **c.** make efficient use of existing infrastructure by redeveloping urbanized areas to better accommodate growth
- **d.** decrease the separation of different land uses
- **e.** encourage the employment of non-automobile forms of transportation, including buses, fixed rail, walking, and bicycling.
These attributes have clear-cut implications for housing and communities as smart growth will result in higher density housing that is located near other land uses, often near city centers and other infill opportunities. At the same time, however, the basic concept of smart growth is ambiguous with regard to affordable housing. On the one hand, smart growth emphasizes increasing density, which can lower the cost of housing. At the same time, however, smart growth can be used to draw urban growth boundaries, limiting housing to relatively compact areas, thereby limiting the supply of land for housing development and therefore increasing the cost of developable land. Smart growth can therefore be used, whether deliberately or not, to decrease the affordability of housing. Although smart growth is sometimes defined as including housing that is affordable to a variety of income groups, frequently it is not (Downs, 2003).

It is not surprising, therefore, that scholars and planners are concerned about smart growth and the effect it has on affordable housing. Given the history of planning and zoning in the U.S., we have a right to be skeptical of how smart growth will be used and for what purposes. From its inception, zoning in the US was used to keep out what were deemed to be undesirable land uses. In the US South a number of cities in the 1920s and beyond used comprehensive zoning as a mechanism for segregating the races. More recently, many American suburban communities have used large lot zoning and sharp limitations on multifamily housing to keep lower income and minority households out of their neighborhoods and towns. Frequently, justifications which undergird the smart growth movement, such as environmental protection and traffic control, are used to rationalize these efforts. In America’s central cities, where smart growth is supposed to concentrate growth through redevelopment and infill, urban renewal and gentrification have often caused displacement and created upward pressure on housing prices.

But while smart growth is a potential threat to affordable housing, it also represents an opportunity. What smart growth offers affordable housing is a compelling concept for organizing our urban areas, but in a way that includes affordable housing. Given the potentially broad appeal of smart growth that ends sprawl and enables urban residents to live in compact cities with mixed land uses with good public transit, affordable housing that is an integral component of smart growth may be able to gain an acceptance that up until now it
has not attained. In some respects, the hope for affordable housing offered by smart growth is similar to the vision held by housing reformer Catherine Bauer Wurster in her writings and work in the 1930s. Wurster advocated a national housing policy that would benefit a broad variety of income levels and that would build upon the communitarian concepts of architects and planners as exemplified by the garden city prototypes of Sunnyside Gardens and Radburn as well as the New Deal Greenbelt towns (Radford, 1996). By integrating affordable housing into a movement to improve our nation’s communities, Wurster recognized that affordable housing would be more likely to obtain the broad popular support that it required to succeed. Unfortunately, as Radford eloquently notes, what resulted were two tiers of federal housing assistance, one invisible, assisting the nation’s many middle income households with tax incentives for home ownership and the other visible, providing a limited number of subsidies for Section 8 and public housing. What Bauer envisioned as an integrated, organic communitarian housing policy has instead become a bifurcated system in which affordable housing is marginalized and denigrated, while housing for the middle class, primarily through ownership of single family homes, has thrived, even though both are dependent on government subsidies, either direct or indirect through the tax code.

Smart growth’s potential for affordable housing, therefore, is that it can serve as a vehicle that begins to end our divided housing system by providing affordable housing in a context that has potentially broad appeal to an American public tired of sprawl, environmental degradation, and traffic congestion. In the same way that the HOPE VI program for revitalizing public housing has used smart growth’s sibling concept of New Urbanism to make mixed income housing marketable, smart growth offers a similar opportunity for affordable housing. In cities throughout the nation, public housing authorities are reconstructing public housing in an effort to make developments attractive to the middle class while continuing to assist the poor. While issues related to displacement and the destruction of communities mark HOPE VI, its approach is still an advance over the older urban renewal program, in which the federal government subsidized redevelopment for residential and commercial projects serving middle income households, with no attempt to retain housing for the poor.¹

But what is meant by affordable housing and how well can it be integrated with smart
growth? Affordable housing is typically defined as “decent” housing that does not cost a household more than 30 percent of income. Originally based on a general dictum that households should not pay more than one week’s pay for monthly housing expenses, this guideline was incorporated into American federal law in 1969 when Congress passed the Brooke Amendment mandating that residents of public housing pay no more than 25 percent of their income for rent. This guideline was raised by the Reagan Administration to 30 percent in 1981 and has been generally accepted by state and local governments as defining affordable housing.

That affordable housing is an important issue is a reflection of the changing nature of the housing problem in the US. Prior to World War II and in the period soon thereafter, the American objective was, in the words of the 1949 Housing Act, “a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American.” Since that time, the number of Americans living in homes that lack basic standards of habitability has shrunk dramatically, albeit not disappearing, especially in areas dominated by rural poverty. Increasingly, Americans live in decent homes, but many of these require households to pay more than 30 percent of their income for housing. According to Harvard University’s Joint Center for Housing Studies 2004 report, “Although the overwhelming major of Americans are well-housed, nearly a third of all households spend 30 percent or more of their incomes on housing and 13 percent spend 50 percent or more (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2004, 4). The report goes on to say that the housing affordability problem is concentrated among the nation’s lowest income groups and is not likely to let up given the rate at which the American economy is producing low wage jobs.

Despite widespread US acceptance of the 30 percent of income guideline for measuring affordability, it is important to remember the limits to this definition. The 30 percent guideline is based on the assumption that for lower income Americans, at least, households spending more than 30 percent of their incomes on housing will lack sufficient income to cover other basic expenses such as food, clothing, health, education, recreation, and transportation. What the 30 percent guideline ignores is the potential interaction between housing costs and these other expenses. If a household lives in a neighborhood where public transit and accessibility mean that it can get by with one or even no personal autos, then the
amount that has to be spent on transportation is likely to go down. If a household lives in a neighborhood where there are abundant recreational opportunities, including walking or bicycling to work or other everyday destinations (and household members regularly use those opportunities!), then health costs can also decrease. It is these interactions between housing, transportation, accessibility, and health, of course, that constitute a key component of smart growth’s attractiveness. By designing communities in which people don’t have to rely on the auto and can exercise by walking or biking to work or at least for recreation, then smart growth can help to reduce the amount that households will have to spend on non-housing goods and services. Obviously, the specification of the connections between housing and non-housing costs in smart growth communities requires further research, but it is clear that it is an area of interest that planners and community designers should pursue.

3. Empirical Research on Smart Growth and Affordable Housing

Table 1 displays summary information on the 40 empirical studies examined by Nelson et al. (2002) that address the impact of growth regulation on housing prices. Many of these studies were done in the 1980s and generally reflect an interest in the impact of growth regulation in communities in the west, particularly California. The overwhelming impression obtained from these studies is that growth regulation does raise housing prices. Thirty two of the forty studies, or 80 percent, report that growth regulation raises housing prices, while only 10 percent of the studies show that there is no relationship between growth regulation and housing prices, with the remaining 10 percent show mixed results.

Despite this general impression, Nelson et al., urge caution in drawing conclusions that growth regulation, per se, is bad for affordable housing. Instead, they contend that if state and local governments combine growth regulation with efforts to assure the supply of affordable housing, then the supply of affordable housing is more likely to be assured. They cite the experience of Portland, Oregon where growth regulatory policies, including urban growth boundaries, are combined with affirmative efforts to establish minimum densities and to assure an adequate supply of multifamily housing that is generally more affordable than single family housing (Nelson et al. 2002). As indicated in Table 1, more recent studies of
Portland have cast doubt on the claim that growth regulation in that community has had a negative impact on housing prices. If jurisdictions pay close attention to using land use regulatory techniques, as well as subsidy approaches, to assuring the supply of affordable housing, then it appears they are more likely to succeed in mitigating the negative impact that smart growth or other regulatory regimes can have on housing affordability.

Other scholars have made this point as well. Miller (1986) compares the record of Petaluma, California and Boulder, Colorado, two communities where growth controls were imposed to limit the actual number of new dwelling units. In contrast to Petaluma, however, Boulder continued to offer moderate priced dwelling units in its market, while this market segment in Petaluma nearly dried up completely. Miller attributes this to several factors, including a greater taste for smaller dwelling units in Boulder as well as a 1973 inclusionary housing ordinance requiring 10 percent of all new dwelling units to be affordable to moderate income households (Miller 1986). Similarly, Zorn et al. (1986) find that the price effects of growth controls in Davis, California are mitigated in part by an inclusionary housing requirement that mandated a certain percentage of new units be affordable at a regulated price. Zorn et al., however, found the mitigatory impact of the inclusionary housing requirement to be greatest in the new housing market, while its impact on the prices of homes in the existing housing was not as great. The implication, of course, is that in order to be effective in preventing price increases in the entire housing market caused by growth controls, mitigation strategies must address the impact of those controls on both new and existing housing (Zorn et al. 1986).

Accepting the dual conclusion that 1) smart growth policies can raise the cost of housing and 2) efforts to assure adequate land for a variety of land uses (e.g. multifamily and attached single family housing) and to promote inclusionary and subsidized housing are likely to mitigate the impacts of growth controls on housing prices, implies there are two critical research questions associated with determining the impact of smart growth on affordable housing. The first question is more or less a political one—how likely is it that jurisdictions enacting smart growth or other regulatory approaches will adopt affirmative approaches to affordable housing? Secondly, what combination of affordable housing strategies work best in enabling a smart growth jurisdiction to mitigate the impacts of growth controls on housing
prices? Before addressing the first question, I will begin to address the second one by laying out the key strategies that have the most potential for mitigating the price effects of smart growth.

4. **Key Strategies for Assuring Affordable Housing in Smart Growth Communities**

   As discussed in the introduction, there are at least three key ways in which Smart Growth can accommodate strategies and incentives for affordable housing. Table 2 displays these strategies which are described in more detail below. Please note that these strategies generally focus on actions that can be taken by state and local governments, independent of actions taken by the federal government. Since the early 1980s, state and local governments in the U.S. have played an increasing role in the provision of affordable housing as the federal role has waned since that time (Stegman and Suchman 1999). Moreover, as recently noted by HUD, state and local governments in the US are “the gatekeepers to much of the affordable housing supply for America’s working families” because they influence the cost, location, and amount of housing built in the US (U.S. HUD 2004, vii).

4.1 **New Development Strategies**

   FLEXIBLE LAND USE REGULATIONS. A most obvious general approach to assuring that affordable housing is developed in smart growth communities is to assure that growth that does take place in these communities includes affordable housing. One key mechanism for accomplishing this goal is assuring that housing is built at high enough density that housing is more likely to be affordable. In contrast to communities, therefore, that have used zoning to reduce the density of housing, by zoning only for single family homes on large lots, jurisdictions that seek to make housing more affordable should start by making certain that sufficient quantities of land are zoned for higher density detached and attached single family housing, multifamily housing, and accessory apartments or dwellings.

   As described in the previous section, Portland, Oregon has adopted an approach that emphasizes the provision of adequate land for higher density single family and multifamily
housing. Under Oregon’s 1973 Land Conservation and Development Act, the state’s land planning agency, the Oregon Land Conservation and Development Commission, adopted the Oregon Metropolitan Housing Rule in 1981. The rule requires jurisdictions with the Portland metropolitan area to maintain minimum densities of six, eight, or ten units per net buildable acre and requires most jurisdictions to zone land so that one-half of new dwellings are attached single family or multi-family housing (Connerly and Smith 1996).

In 1991, 1000 Friends of Oregon, a growth management advocacy organization, and the Home Builders Association of Metropolitan Portland sponsored an evaluation of the Metropolitan Housing Rule. In general, they found that Metropolitan Housing Rule has been successful in stimulating an increase in multi-family and higher density housing beyond what have otherwise been constructed (1000 Friends of Oregon 1991).

Other tools for assuring higher density housing include making certain that zoning regulations do not impose significant cost barriers through requirements for minimum setback, minimum square footage, minimum parking requirements, and bans on accessory dwelling units. Regulations permitting accessory apartments provide the opportunity to increase density in single family neighborhoods by permitting homeowners to have apartments on their property. Accessory units can be incorporated in the dwelling, or as an addition, or built on top of the garage. Occupancy can be limited to relatives, thereby enabling families to house an elderly or disabled adult family member, or extended to non-familial renters, whose rents will therefore be a source of income to the homeowner. In Cary, North Carolina, a rapidly growing community in the Research Triangle Park area, the zoning code permits all single-family homes to have accessory apartments for occupancy by a relative (Smart Growth Network Subgroup on Affordable Housing 2001).

INCLUSIONARY ZONING. Inclusionary zoning takes the flexible zoning concepts just discussed a step further by requiring that new residential developments set aside a fixed percentage of new dwelling units for affordable housing. The term, inclusionary zoning, reflects the fact that the concept was developed to counter the employment of exclusionary zoning, through such means as large lot zoning. Although inclusionary zoning is most commonly found in communities in California, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Jersey and to a lesser extent in Rhode Island, the single best known inclusionary zoning ordinance is
found in Montgomery County, Maryland, just outside of Washington, DC. For thirty years, new residential developments of fifty units (lowered to thirty-five in 2002) or more have been required to set aside 12.5 to 15.0 percent of their new units for affordable housing under the County’s Moderate Priced Dwelling Unit (MPDU) program. In return for meeting the program’s requirements, developers are permitted to build more units than they would otherwise be permitted. This density bonus adds up to 22 percent more units that can be developed. Since its creation in 1973, the MPDU program has produced over 11,000 units of affordable housing (Porter 2004; Montgomery County 2004).

Inclusionary zoning has several key advantages. First, because inclusionary zoning is directly linked to the production of new dwelling units, it provides a straightforward mechanism for assuring that growth, whether smart or sprawled, includes affordable dwelling units. Although inclusionary zoning has been criticized for relying exclusively on new development, in a context of smart growth this is not necessarily a liability. Secondly, because density bonuses are frequently awarded developers of inclusionary housing development, the higher overall densities enable compact development, thereby meeting a key objective of smart growth. Third, by providing affordable housing in all new developments, lower income and minority households are less likely to be segregated than where new development consists exclusively of large, expensive homes. Moreover, by relying on the private or non-profit sector to actually build affordable housing, inclusionary zoning can foster an effective collaboration between government and the non-government sector. This assures that the location and type of housing will be more responsive to the price signals sent by the private market—a factor often not recognized in the more traditional government-driven public housing program in which the location and style of dwelling units were more reflective of politics than the private market (Burchell and Galley 2000; Porter 2004).

At the same time, inclusionary zoning has several disadvantages. Most fundamental is the belief by developers that inclusionary zoning adds to the cost of the market-rate units that are not sold or rented as affordable housing. Developers assert that the cost of building the affordable units is then passed onto purchasers or renters of the market-rate units, a burden they believe to be unfair (Burchell and Galley 2000). Others are concerned that a policy of
inclusionary zoning that leads to the dispersal of the poor can also result in the deconcentrating of minority and ethnic groups, thereby diluting their political power and culture (Burchell and Galley 2000; Pyatok 2004). Finally, in New Jersey, where the “builder’s remedy” allows developers to build inclusionary housing development where jurisdictions have not adopted affordable housing plans, such developments are accused of promoting rather than discouraging sprawl (Carlson and Mathur 2004; Burchell and Galley 2000; Lawrence 2001).

Overall, after 30 years, inclusionary zoning still has much to promise, but has been somewhat disappointing in its impact. To some degree, this reflects the fact that in spite of the success in Montgomery County, Maryland, many of the 600 or so jurisdictions with inclusionary zoning produce relatively few units (Porter 2004). But even more distressing is the fact that relatively few jurisdictions have even adopted inclusionary zoning laws. Most jurisdictions adopting inclusionary zoning are concentrated in a few states in the northeast and the west. Even though inclusionary has been shown to be an effective producer of affordable housing, most jurisdictions prefer not to adopt it. This, of course, has significant implications for the likelihood that jurisdictions adopting smart growth will also adopt inclusionary zoning to make sure that adequate affordable housing is produced to meet the needs of population growth.

HOUSING TRUST FUNDS. Housing trust funds were primarily developed beginning in the 1980s as the federal government began to greatly reduce federal support for subsidized housing. Since that time, many state and local governments have identified special sources of revenue that they have dedicated in a trust fund for the subsidization of affordable housing. Often these revenue sources are related to real estate development, including real estate transfer taxes, tax increment financing, and condominium conversion taxes (Connerly 1993). For this reason, housing trust funds are also appropriate to smart growth strategies that seek to address affordable housing needs.

One of the best known housing trust funds in the nation is Florida’s State Housing Initiatives Partnership (SHIP) program. It was adopted by the Florida legislature and signed into law in 1992 by the Governor as the William Sadowski Act. Distributing $126 million to local governments in 2004-2005, it is reputedly the largest state housing trust fund in the
nation. SHIP is funded by a single dedicated revenue source: a portion of the state's documentary tax on the transfer of deeds. The amount of revenue was originally set at $.10 for every $100 of property value, with 50 percent for state housing programs and 50 percent for SHIP. In 1995, an amount equivalent to an additional $.10 per $100 was set aside with 69 percent for SHIP and 31 percent for state housing programs. SHIP funds are distributed as a block grant to all 69 Florida counties and to cities of 50,000 or more within those counties. Funds are distributed on the basis of population.

Passage of the Sadowski Act was enabled by the coming together of a coalition that included housing advocates, local central city governments, along with the Florida associations of homebuilders and realtors. The homebuilder and realtor members of the “Sadowski Act Coalition” were undoubtedly influenced by provisions in the legislation that require that a minimum of 65 percent of funds be used for subsidizing owner-occupied housing and 75 percent be set aside for subsidizing the construction or rehabilitation of affordable housing, with the remainder eligible for being used to subsidize existing, unrehabilitated housing (Pattison 2001).

Given the direct linkage of housing trust funds, such as Florida’s SHIP program, to new development, both through its source of funding and, at least in the case of Florida, through its focus on new construction, housing trust funds can be vital adjuncts to the creation of affordable housing. In the context of inclusionary zoning, they can provide actual subsidy funds for affordable housing to help buy down the cost of housing while assuring builders that they will not have to pass any additional costs on to consumers of market-rate housing. Both Florida and San Diego’s housing trust funds demonstrate that broad-based coalitions, including homebuilders and realtors, can be formed in support of affordable housing (Calavita and Grimes 1992). The success in building such coalitions augers well for encouraging the adoption of inclusionary zoning programs that utilize housing trust fund subsidization.

4.2 Redevelopment Strategies

Redevelopment of central city neighborhoods is a logical component of any
jurisdictions’s smart growth strategy. Building on preferences for high density, accessibility, mass transit, and mixed land uses, smart growth advocates are likely to see central city neighborhoods as already possessing the key characteristics that they seek to propagate. In many instances, vacant or underutilized properties can be obtained at relatively low cost and redeveloped, either through rehabilitation or new construction on vacant or infill housing lots. Cities, such as Cleveland, Ohio and Atlanta, Georgia, have developed elaborate land banking programs which are designed to acquire vacant parcels so that they can eventually be reused or redeveloped (Mueller 2003).

As in new development, the availability of affordable housing in redeveloping areas is a major issue. In many instances, redevelopment causes or is associated with gentrification in which lower income households are displaced by higher income households as areas that once had a concentration of affordable, if deteriorated housing, are rehabilitated in order to be able to attract a higher income population (Kennedy and Leonard 2001).

Efforts to achieve mixed income redevelopment attempt to mitigate, at least in part, the displacement effects of revitalization by making certain, similar to inclusionary zoning, that a fixed percentage of dwelling units are set aside for affordable housing. An example of this is found in the Quality Hill neighborhood in Kansas City, Missouri. A Victorian-era neighborhood on a bluff near downtown Kansas City, Quality Hill had fallen on hard times as the original gentry moved away to escape the smell of the Kansas City stockyards that were built below the bluff. A St. Louis, Missouri development company that specialized in redeveloping inner city areas for mixed income housing was brought in and through a combination of historic preservation and infill development, was able to redevelop five city blocks in the neighborhood. One-fifth of the 493 newly created residential units were set aside for households earning 80 percent or less of median income with an additional set aside for households earning 60 percent or less of area median income (Benfield et al, 2001). California has gone another step and formalized a requirement that redevelopment agencies must set aside 20 percent of tax increment financing redevelopment funds for low and moderate income housing (California Health and Safety Code Section 33334.2).

An alternative to such set asides is found in redeveloping low income neighborhoods where local leaders attempt to revitalize the neighborhood while preserving much of the
housing stock as affordable. A leading example of this approach can be found in the Dudley Street neighborhood in Boston, Massachusetts. Located less than two miles from downtown Boston, a combination of economic and demographic changes, combined with arson and threats of urban renewal, led to the neighborhood becoming one of the poorest in Boston. By the early 1980s, much of the neighborhood’s land had become vacant and the area was being used increasingly as a place for illegal trash transfer stations and illegally dumped trash. Through a very effective residents organization, Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI), with assistance from two foundations and eventually the City of Boston, the neighborhood has been able to turn the neighborhood around through, in part, the construction or rehabilitation of approximately 700 dwelling units, many of them located on the neighborhood’s vacant lots (Medoff and Sklar 1994; Benfield et al. 2001).

In order to preserve the affordability of these units and to protect residents from displacement, DSNI created a community land trust (CLT), Dudley Neighbors, Incorporated. Community land trusts achieve these goals by retaining the title to the land on which affordable units rest, while the title to improvements on the land is possessed by the homeowner who leases the land from the CLT. In this way, the CLT protects its interest in the land and maintains the affordability of the houses built on the land. At the same time, because the land is not being purchased, the buyer does not have to pay as much for the house. Dudley Neighbors, Inc. community land trust currently owns land on which 140 community land trust dwellings are located with plans for an additional 200 units. DNI’s properties are located in the 60-acre Dudley Triangle area at the center of the Dudley neighborhood. The properties were obtained by DNI from private owners through eminent domain powers granted to the CLT by the City of Boston as well as from lands owned by the City (Benfield 2001; Dudley Neighbors, Incorporated 2004). Although community land trusts can be employed to preserve affordability in existing neighborhoods such as Dudley Street, they can also be used in newly developing areas.

Despite such efforts to develop affordable housing in inner city areas, redevelopment will often feature efforts to attract middle and upper income households to inner city neighborhoods. In a system of fragmented municipalities, as exists in the United States, local jurisdictions, including central cities, will continue to compete for higher income households.
This is clearly illustrated in efforts by local governments to use the federal government’s HOPE VI program, currently one of the nation’s most significant programs for inner city redevelopment, to revitalize central city public housing developments and neighborhoods by converting low income public housing to mixed income housing. While cities such as Chicago and Atlanta have relied extensively on the HOPE VI program for redevelopment, the question of displacement and the impact of displacement on low income households formerly living in HOPE VI developments has a major impact on the degree to which inner city redevelopment plays a positive or negative role in meeting affordable housing needs.

Initial studies that track the fate of residents relocating from HOPE VI revitalized public housing indicate a very mixed picture of success in finding decent housing in good neighborhoods. Half of those formerly living in public housing were living in private housing and a majority of these were having difficulty paying rent, regardless of whether they were receiving housing vouchers or not. Moreover, in tighter housing markets, about 40 percent of former public housing residents find themselves living in high-poverty neighborhoods, just as they did when they lived in public housing (Popkin et al. 2004). Such studies as this, therefore, suggest caution in urging central city redevelopment as a key to expanding affordable housing opportunities.

### 4.3 Smart Growth-Related Strategies

Through its emphasis on compact development that seeks to protect the environment and reduce energy consumption, smart growth can also make housing more affordable by reducing the costs associated with operating a dwelling unit. In particular, two ways in which smart growth communities can reduce housing costs are by reducing the costs associated with transportation and energy consumption.

**LOCATION EFFICIENT MORTGAGE.** The location efficient mortgage is an attempt to incorporate the cost savings associated with living in a neighborhood that offers accessibility to employment and other destinations as well as good quality public transportation. These savings are realized through lesser dependence on the automobile for transportation. In areas with good public transportation, one or more workers living in the
household may be able to avoid automobile ownership using public transit or other means for getting to work. By reducing the number of cars that have to be purchased and cared for, a household will realize a financial savings that can be placed into paying for a more expensive house.

The location efficient mortgage, developed by the Center for Neighborhood Technology and Fannie Mae, incorporates these cost savings by permitting households to pay a higher percentage of their income for housing costs. This enables households to purchase a more expensive house than they would otherwise be able to. As such, the location efficient mortgage does not make housing more affordable, but it increases the amount of housing that a household can afford. Currently, the location efficient mortgage is being operated as a limited demonstration and is available only in Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle. The purpose of the demonstration is to both determine the acceptance of the mortgage by lenders and borrowers as well as to test the degree to which increasing housing costs relative to income increases the risk associated with making home loans (Krizek 2003). Given that the data relevant to these critical issues is still being generated in these cities, it remains unclear to what degree the location efficient mortgage will become a financing tool that will be available to smart growth community residents throughout the nation.

ENERGY EFFICIENT MORTGAGE. Although smart growth focuses primarily on the energy efficiency obtained through the design of urban places that promote compactness, accessibility, and energy efficient transit, it is compatible with the design of homes that also conserve energy. Operating under the same principle as the location efficient mortgage, the energy efficient mortgage rewards households whose homes are designed to reduce monthly utility costs by enabling them to spend a higher percent of their income on the purchase of the home, thereby increasing their effective income for home purchase. Fannie Mae has also developed a energy efficient mortgage, which can be used for energy efficient homes, regardless of whether they are located in smart growth communities, although clearly their employment in smart growth communities further magnifies energy savings associated with reducing the number vehicle-miles traveled in private autos (Fannie Mae 2004). The State of Colorado adds to the advantages of energy efficient mortgages by making a loan program which provides below market interest rate loans to purchasers of energy efficient homes
4.4 Assessment

While all of these strategies are useful to enabling smart growth to provide adequate numbers of affordable housing units, it certainly seems that the New Development Strategies shown in Table 2 are key to realizing an increase in affordable housing that is commensurate with not only the growth in the overall housing market that one expects in smart growth communities but also the locus of economic and educational opportunity that is frequently found in newly developing areas that are attractive to middle and upper income households. Flexible zoning that allocates land for higher density and multi-family housing is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for affordable housing development in new developing areas. Inclusionary zoning is able to be more effective in assuring adequate supplies of new affordable housing when it is layered over a land use plan that enables higher density and multi-family housing. Inclusionary zoning not only better assures that there will be a growing supply of affordable housing, but also provides lower income households with opportunities to move to newly developing areas that often feature educational and employment opportunities frequently lacking in inner city neighborhoods. Inclusionary housing, therefore, not only addresses the affordable housing supply issue but also addresses the “geography of opportunity” challenge by recognizing that in the U.S. at least, where there are great spatial variations in economic and educational opportunity and limited public transit, housing influences the opportunities an individual has for getting a good education and a decent job (Rosenbaum 1995). Finally, as indicated, housing trust funds provide a source of state and local funding that is often related to the actual population and economic growth of a community. Consequently, housing trust funds are especially useful in high growth areas that are often viewed as ripe for smart growth development.

5. Assessing the Prospects for Adopting Affordable Housing Strategies in Smart Growth Communities

Despite the availability of significant affordable housing strategies that can be adopted at
the state and local government level as well as the current high interest in smart growth
development, it remains to be seen whether smart growth communities will elect to offset the
increase in housing prices often associated with growth limitations by coupling smart growth
with effective affordable housing interventions. While a definitive answer to this question of
whether smart growth is an opportunity or threat for affordable housing requires a systematic
study of smart growth and non-smart growth communities, a preliminary answer is attempted
by examining the case of Florida. Although Florida is not a smart growth state, its growth
management legislation, most notably the 1985 Growth Management Act, in combination
with the State Housing Initiatives Partnership (SHIP) housing trust fund cited earlier, mean
that the state has the tools necessary to achieve both smart growth and affordable housing.
Given this context, therefore, the question addressed here becomes whether communities in
the state, within the context of state oversight, will adopt affordable housing strategies that
will complement their smart growth policies.

5.1 Framework for Smart Growth and Affordable Housing in Florida

The 1985 Growth Management Act was adopted in response to concerns that Florida was
not adequately protecting its sensitive water-based environment and that its rapid population
growth was outstripping the capacity of its infrastructure to meet that growth, resulting in
inadequate transportation and traffic congestion in particular as well as threats to the state’s
other infrastructure components, such as fresh water, sanitary sewers and stormwater
drainage (DeGrove and Metzger 1993; Anthony 2003). The 1985 Act attempted to address
these problems with three key concepts: comprehensiveness, consistency, and concurrency.
Under the Act, each local jurisdiction in the state is required to prepare a plan that deals
comprehensively with a variety of issues including future land use, transportation,
infrastructure, coastal management, recreation and open space, intergovernmental
coordination, capital improvements, environmental conservation, and housing. Secondly,
city and county comprehensive plans must be consistent with regional plans and the state
comprehensive plan (Anthony 2003).

Finally, and most important to smart growth, the 1985 Growth Management Act
incorporated the principle of concurrency under which no development orders are to be issued unless there is infrastructure concurrently available that can support the demands placed by the development on transportation facilities (including mass transit), sanitary sewers, parks and recreation, drainage, solid waste, or potable water supply (Anthony 2003; Florida Statutes, Chapter 163.3180). Concurrency was designed to prevent communities from authorizing developments for which there was inadequate infrastructure. In may cases in Florida, local jurisdictions elect to meet the 1985 Act’s concurrency requirements by establishing Urban Services Areas (USA’s) which are similar in impact to the urban growth boundaries employed in smart growth planning (DeGrove and Metzger 1993). To uphold concurrency, jurisdictions establish USAs with the commitment that higher density development will be permitted within the Urban Services Area while only low density development, placing few demands on infrastructure, will be permitted outside the USA. By concentrating higher density development within the USA, the Urban Services Area boundary serves the same purpose as the Urban Growth Boundary: containing growth and limiting sprawl (Warnken 2003).

Overall, the 1985 Growth Management Act’s employment of concurrency and Urban Services Areas is compatible with smart growth in several key ways:

a. It attempts to increase the density of development so that infrastructure can be more efficiently utilized.

b. It increases the compactness of urban places by employing Urban Services Areas that are similar in impact to urban growth boundaries.

c. It seeks to promote efficient use of existing infrastructure by redeveloping urbanized areas to better accommodate growth.

The latter is promoted by the 1985 Growth Management Act’s exemption of concurrency requirements for downtown, urban infill, and urban redevelopment areas (Florida Statutes, Chapter 163.3180(5)(b)). Although the 1984 Growth Management Act is silent on the promotion of mixed use development and the encouragement of non-automobile forms of transportation, it nevertheless embodies these other key principles of smart growth.

Moreover, the 1985 Growth Management Act, along with the State Housing Initiatives
Partnership (SHIP) housing trust fund, establishes a framework for assuring that affordable housing is linked to smart growth in the state’s communities. Along with other key housing requirements, the 1985 Act directly addresses affordable housing as it pertains to smart growth through requirements for the following items in a jurisdiction’s housing element:

a. The provision of housing for all current and anticipated future residents of the jurisdiction...

b. The provision of adequate sites for future housing, including housing for low-income, very low-income, and moderate-income families, mobile homes, and group home facilities and foster care facilities, with supporting infrastructure and public facilities...

c. The creation or preservation of affordable housing to minimize the need for additional local services and avoid the concentration of affordable housing units only in specific areas of the jurisdiction (Florida Statutes, Chapter 163.3177(f)1).

These requirements mean that Florida jurisdictions are expected to ensure that there is adequate sites for all future residents regardless of their incomes and that jurisdictions should seek to avoid concentrating affordable housing in limited geographic areas. Taken together, these requirements imply that Florida communities are to adopt an inclusionary zoning approach to regulating their growth. In doing so, they would assure that there are adequate sites for all income levels while also assuring that affordable housing would not be concentrated in existing parts of the community, but would also be found in newly developing areas.

Moreover, with the adoption of the 1992 William Sadowski Act creating the SHIP housing trust fund, it would seem that Florida communities would be in a strong position to not only use the 1985 Growth Management Act to encourage or mandate inclusionary zoning, but to assist in the development of affordable housing in newly developing areas by providing SHIP funds for grants or below market interest rate loans that would benefit lower income owners and renters, while easing any cost impacts on developments that provide affordable housing through inclusionary zoning.

An additional incentive for assuring that affordable housing strategies are incorporated in
growth management and smart growth strategies in Florida is the fact that evidence shows that implementation of the 1985 Act is decreasing housing affordability in Florida, just as it appears to have done in most of the other studies shown in Table 1. According to an interrupted time series analysis of Florida over a sixteen year period from 1980 through 1995 (thereby accounting for periods both before passage of the 1985 Growth Management Act and after adoption by all jurisdictions of comprehensive plans under the Act), the enactment of a 1985 Growth Management Act-mandated plan had a significantly negative impact on housing affordability in the state (Anthony 2003).^2

5.2 Implementation of Smart Growth and Affordable Housing in Florida

Despite the smart growth and affordable housing framework established by the 1985 Growth Management Act and the SHIP housing trust fund, Florida jurisdictions implementing the smart growth features of the 1985 Act have not sought to play a very active role in assuring that adequate affordable housing is created to meet the needs of a growing population. A 1993 study of ten representative jurisdictions’ housing elements, each of which had been approved by the 1985 Growth Management Act’s implementing agency, the Florida Department of Community Affairs, shows that none of the ten housing elements featured bold strategies for addressing housing affordability problems (Connerly and Muller 1993). In particular, the researchers found that none of the jurisdictions were prepared to employ creative affordable housing strategies such as inclusionary zoning.^3 Followup investigation by Florida’s Affordable Housing Study Commission indicates that Florida’s housing elements still lack clear and imaginative strategies for addressing affordable housing problems—this in spite of the fact that since the state’s initial round of housing elements were completed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the state had adopted the 1992 SHIP housing trust fund, thereby providing significant new revenue for affordable housing.

Noting that Florida growth management law does not require jurisdictions to set specific affordable housing targets in their housing elements, the Affordable Housing Study Commission report found that “...many local governments adopt vague goals, objectives, and policies that do not provide accountability (Florida Affordable Housing Study Commission
In a number of instances, jurisdictions are allowed to claim that they have no housing need or that no land is available for housing development (Florida Affordable Housing Study Commission 1999; Whoriskey 1999). As a remedy, the Commission proposed that affordable housing be treated like infrastructure, for which local governments are required to develop specific estimates of need, cost, and sources of financing.

In general, therefore, it appears that without a more assertive mandate by the state’s growth management legislation to incorporate affordable housing strategies, that local jurisdictions will continue to practice elements of smart growth, but without serious attention to assuring that affordable housing is made available in a fashion that is commensurate with growing population demand. While the Florida legislature has provided a framework that can incorporate both smart growth and affordable housing, without a mandate to assure affordable housing, local jurisdictions will lack the incentive to develop affordable housing.

Working against the incorporation of affordable housing strategies, of course, is the fact that many neighborhoods and jurisdictions do not see affordable housing contributing to the quality of life they seek in their communities. Residents of Florida’s communities as well as other communities in the nation display NIMBY—Not in My Backyard—attitudes toward affordable housing in their neighborhood (Ross 2001; Florida Housing Coalition 2000). Local governments respond to these sentiments as well as to concerns that affordable housing development fails to “pay its own way.” In response to a case where a proposed farmworker housing development was threatened by NIMBY attitudes, housing advocates were able to use existing Federal and Florida protections against racial and ethnic discrimination to assure the development was completed. Prompted by this case, however, Florida housing advocates were able to get the Florida legislature to amend the Florida Fair Housing Act in 2000 so that land use decisions cannot be made on the basis of the “source of financing” for a affordable housing development (Florida Housing Coalition 2000).

At the same time, however, at the recommendation of the 2001 Florida’s Growth Study Commission, appointed by Governor Jeb Bush, the State of Florida is encouraging jurisdictions to adopt a “uniform fiscal impact analysis tool” to ascertain the relative costs and benefits of new development proposals. According to knowledgeable sources, the Fiscal Impact Analysis Model or FIAM, generally finds that affordable housing does not pay for
itself. The fear exists, therefore, that under state sanction, Florida communities will be able to practice exclusionary development regulation because they will be able to use this new tool to keep out affordable housing. As of September 2004, the application of FIAM to affordable housing continues to be debated in state government.

Given the fact that the State of Florida has not pushed for effective affordable housing strategies at the local level, it should not be surprising that no jurisdiction in Florida has adopted the clearest, most straightforward approach to assuring that an adequate supply of affordable housing is available to meet growing population needs: inclusionary zoning (Ross 2004). This is in contrast to states such as California, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut where a total of 525 jurisdictions have adopted inclusionary zoning. Each of these states mandates in one fashion or another that local jurisdictions have an obligation to provide affordable housing (Porter 2004). Although Florida’s 1985 Growth Management Act implies the need for affordable housing, the act has never been interpreted by the state’s land planning agency, the Florida Department of Community Affairs, as requiring any specific approaches, such as inclusionary zoning.

The relatively small likelihood of any jurisdiction in Florida adopting inclusionary housing is reflected by the struggle experienced in Tallahassee, the state’s capitol, with efforts to adopt an inclusionary zoning ordinance. In many ways, Tallahassee is ideally suited as a place that should adopt inclusionary zoning in connection with its smart growth strategies, most notably its Urban Services Area boundary (Warnken 2003). First, it is one of the most liberal communities in the state, regularly voting for Democratic candidates when the remainder of the state primarily supports Republicans. With two large universities and state government as the chief employers, its work force is generally well educated. Moreover, as the only incorporated jurisdiction in Leon County, Tallahassee, which has been able to employ aggressive annexation policies, is able to incorporate a substantial amount of suburban growth within its city limits. In addition, Tallahassee and Leon County planning is overseen by a joint city-county planning commission and staff and a unified city-county comprehensive plan.

Tallahassee had shown its interest in inclusionary zoning by adopting an inclusionary zoning policy in its 1990 comprehensive plan. Despite this, the inclusionary policy has never
been codified as an ordinance and has never even been adopted as a policy in the housing element.\textsuperscript{5} In 1996, in its state-mandated Evaluation and Appraisal Report (EAR), the Tallahassee and Leon County Planning Department identified problems with the economic segregation of Tallahassee’s poorest residents, many of whom live on the city’s Southside while the city’s more affluent residents live on the city’s Northside (Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department 1996). Despite the good efforts of the Planning Department’s lead housing planner, as well as some effective housing advocates, eight years have passed since the EAR report identified inclusionary zoning as a key strategy and still Tallahassee and Leon County have not adopted an inclusionary zoning ordinance. These years have been marked by sharp disagreement over the necessity of such an ordinance with the Leon County Board of Commissioners finally electing to only adopt a incentive-based, voluntary program. The City of Tallahassee is still considering an incentive-based mandatory program, but no date has been set for a final decision by the City Commission. In the mean time, real estate development interests continue to view the ordinance skeptically (Tedder 2004) even though it has been substantially watered down from its original version.\textsuperscript{6}

Although other jurisdictions in Florida are reportedly also considering the adoption of inclusionary zoning ordinances, the fact that one of the state’s more liberal cities has taken at least eight years to adopt an ordinance and may not adopt one at all does not inspire optimism that many communities in Florida will also adopt inclusionary zoning ordinances.\textsuperscript{7} Overall, therefore, Tallahassee’s experience does not bode well for smart growth serving as a key opportunity for the promotion of affordable housing in Florida.

6. **Conclusion and Suggestions for Further Research**

The Florida case appears to suggest that while communities and even a state are willing to adopt aspects of smart growth for guiding their development, they are much less inclined to make certain that affordable housing is an important component of smart growth. Given the ambiguity of smart growth principles to affordable housing, it is not surprising that communities pursuing smart growth can pick and choose as to whether they also wish to promote affordable housing. Nevertheless, because of smart growth’s potentially broad
appeal, it is important for housing advocates to continue to see in smart growth the possibility for not only redesigning our urban areas, but also including affordable housing throughout these areas. If planners and housing advocates can succeed in firmly planting affordable housing in the public’s perception of smart growth, smart growth may provide affordable housing with the cover it desperately needs.

A number of research questions are suggested by this discussion. First, what are the specific barriers to inclusionary zoning? While many members of the development community are no doubt opposed to inclusionary zoning, it would be useful to know in more detail the sources of opposition. Is it primarily developers who oppose being required to build affordable housing or does this sentiment pervade popular opinion as well? What are the specific reasons given for opposition to inclusionary zoning? What possibilities exist for negotiating agreements with inclusionary zoning opponents through the application of additional incentives, including subsidies? What type of coalitions are effective in overcoming opposition to inclusionary zoning? Is it possible to assemble the same type of housing advocate-homebuilder-realtor coalition that successfully lobbied for Florida’s SHIP housing trust fund—a coalition that would value both the social and economic benefits (including the availability of a nearby workforce for lower paying service positions needed by many communities) of integrating affordable housing in new developments? Answers to these questions can be obtained by examining the politics of inclusionary zoning in cities that have recently adopted inclusionary zoning as well as those, like communities in Florida, that have considered but failed to adopt inclusionary zoning.

A second set of research questions can focus on the actual impact of inclusionary zoning and other affordable housing strategies in moderating the inflationary impacts of smart growth and growth management communities. To what degree does inclusionary zoning, or the other strategies discussed here, actually succeed in reducing housing costs in smart growth communities? Research discussed above (e.g. Miller 1986) suggests that active encouragement of affordable housing does mitigate the price effects of smart growth; research on other communities would provide more information on whether this is true or not.

A third set of research questions focuses on the actual savings in monthly non-housing
costs associated with living in smart growth communities. As discussed earlier, living in smart growth communities should reduce the need for a second or even a first automobile and can reduce the amount of energy that is consumed in the home. Smart growth communities are also touted for the opportunities they provide for active living and physical exercise. To the degree to which smart growth communities produce health effects, there is the potential for reducing medical costs. While the latter may not translate into a “health efficient” mortgage purchasable by Fannie Mae, a reduction in health expenses still enables people to reduce their health expenses.

Finally, it is important to obtain a better understanding of how US strategies for stimulating the production of affordable housing in smart growth communities compare to European strategies. Far too often, US and European housing research is done in isolation from each other. And yet, as advanced, industrialized nations, the US and Europe share much in common. Certainly, a comparison of US and European approaches to inclusionary zoning is due. What can the US and Europe learn from each other in applying this concept to enabling smart growth regimes to also include affordable housing? What strategies in the US or in Europe are transferrable across the Atlantic?
Table 1: Empirical Evidence on the Impact of Growth Regulation on Housing Prices

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Impact?</th>
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<tr>
<td>Segal and Srinivasan (1985)</td>
<td>National</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Land Institute (1977)</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black and Hoben (1985)</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guidry, Shilling, and Sirmans (1991)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chambers and Diamond (1988)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rose (1989)</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shilling (1991)</td>
<td>National</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dowall and Landis (1982)</td>
<td>San Francisco Bay Area</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dowall (1984)</td>
<td>Santa Rosa, Napa, California</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landis (1986)</td>
<td>Sacramento, Fresno, San Jose, California</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Downs (1992)</td>
<td>San Diego County</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Katz and Rosen (1987)</td>
<td>San Francisco Bay Area</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landis (1992)</td>
<td>California</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elliot (1981)</td>
<td>California</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schwartz et al. (1981, 1984)</td>
<td>Petaluma, Santa Rosa, Rohnert Park, California</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Glickfield and Levine (1992)</td>
<td>California</td>
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<td>Mercer and Morgan (1982)</td>
<td>Santa Barbara County, California</td>
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<td>Zorn et al. (1986)</td>
<td>Davis, California</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Miller (1986)</td>
<td>Boulder, Colorado</td>
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<td>Pollakowski and Wachter (1990)</td>
<td>Montgomery County, Maryland</td>
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<td>Porter et al. (1996)</td>
<td>Montgomery County, Maryland</td>
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<td>Peterson (1973)</td>
<td>Fairfax County, Virginia</td>
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<td>Beaton (1991)</td>
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<td>Real Estate Research Corp (1978)</td>
<td>St. Louis County, Missouri</td>
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<td>Gleeson (1978)</td>
<td>Brooklyn Park, Minnesota</td>
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<td>Nelson (1986)</td>
<td>Salem, Oregon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Correll, Lillydahl, and Singell (1978)</td>
<td>Boulder, Colorado</td>
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<td>Nelson (1988)</td>
<td>Washington County, Oregon</td>
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<td>Knaap (1985)</td>
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<td>Knaap and Nelson (1992)</td>
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<td>Phillips and Goodstein (2000)</td>
<td>Portland, Oregon</td>
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<td>Downs (2002)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frech and Lafferty (1984)</td>
<td>California Coast</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dale-Johnson and Kim (1990)</td>
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<td>Richardson (1976)</td>
<td>Dover Township, New Jersey</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Parsons (1992)</td>
<td>Chesapeake Bay, Maryland</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Beaton and Pollock (1992)</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luger and Temkin (2000)</td>
<td>New Jersey, North Carolina</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lowry and Ferguson (1992)</td>
<td>Sacramento, Orlando, Nashville</td>
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<td>Green (1999)</td>
<td>Suburban Wisconsin</td>
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Source: Nelson, Pendall, Dawkins, Knaap, 2002
8. **Table 2: Strategies and Examples for Incorporating Affordable Housing into Smart Growth Communities**

a. **New Development Strategies**

- Flexible Land use Regulations (Portland, Oregon; Cary, North Carolina)
- Inclusionary Zoning (Montgomery County, Maryland)
- Housing Trust Funds (Florida State Housing Initiatives Partnership (SHIP))

b. **Redevelopment Strategies**

- Mixed Income Redevelopment and Infill Housing (Quality Hill neighborhood, Kansas City, Missouri)
- Community Land Trust (Dudley Street neighborhood, Boston, Massachusetts)

c. **Smart Growth-Related Strategies**

- Location Efficient Mortgages (Chicago, Illinois)
- Energy Efficient Mortgages (Colorado)
9. References


Florida Housing Coalition, Creating Inclusive Communities, 2000, Tallahassee, Florida.

Florida’s Growth Management Study Commission, A Liveable Florida for Today and


Thomas Miller, “Must Growth Restrictions Eliminate Moderate-Priced Housing?” Journal of the American Planning Association, 52 (Summer 1986), 319-325.


Douglas R. Porter, “Promise and Practice of Inclusionary Zoning” in Anthony Downs (ed.) Growth Management and Affordable Housing: Do They Conflict?, Brookings Institution Press,


Jaimie Ross, affordable housing director, 1000 Friends of Florida, telephone interview by author, September 13, 2004.


Michael Stegman and Diane Suchman, *State and Local Affordable Housing Programs*, Urban Land Institute, 1999.


Wayne Tedder, director, Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department, interview by author, September 7, 2004.


10. **Endnotes**

1. For a contrasting view, see Keating, 2000.

2. Anthony’s research is not directly comparable to the studies shown in Table 1 because it measures the impact of growth management on housing affordability, not on housing prices. Nevertheless, Anthony’s findings are consistent with the studies shown in Table 1.

3. Dade County’s housing element proposed adoption of inclusionary zoning, but the County never adopted this proposal. Interview with Jaimie Ross, September 13, 2004.

4. Key West actually has an inclusionary zoning ordinance, but residential developments in that city are never large enough to meet the minimum threshold that triggers the ordinance. Interview with Jaimie Ross, September 13, 2004.

5. Although Tallahassee and Leon County adopted a joint comprehensive plan, the housing element was one element in which the two jurisdictions maintained their separate identity, reflecting fundamental disagreement between Tallahassee, which preferred a more active housing role for local government, and Leon County.

6. The current version of the proposed ordinance contains no provision for maintaining affordability in housing developed under the program.

7. Currently, Ft. Lauderdale, Sarasota County, Manatee County, and Miami-Dade County are considering inclusionary zoning proposals. Interview with Jaimie Ross, September 13, 2004.